No Definite Answer from Past Episodes
Past episodes of stockmarket crashes do not provide a definite answer on whether
a crash affects the real economy. The stockmarket crash in October 1987 had hardly
any impact on the U.S. or on the Malaysian economy. However, the Nikkei's plunge
of over 50 percent in 1990 has been blamed for causing the stagnation in the Japanese
economy, including the drop in property values and the risk of collapse of financial
institutions. Wall Street's crash in 1929 has also been blamed for causing the Great
Depression which lasted for four years.
Looking for a negative correlation between the stockmarket and real economic variables
is the most straightforward way of finding out. However, the direction of causality
is not necesarily obvious. First, share prices are based on future expected profits.
Since profits are closely linked to the economy, a collapse in the stockmarket may
occur simply because the economy's prospects have become bleaker. The stockmarket
index in this instance is simply a leading indicator of the economy's direction.
Second, the impact of a crash is very much dependent on how policymakers respond
to the crisis. If central bankers respond by raising liquidity, as they did in the
aftermath of October 1987, a potential recession may be prevented. Assessing the
impact of a stockmarket crash is therefore not straightforward given the difficulty
of separating out the forward-looking behaviour of investors and the reactionary
behaviour of policymakers.
The Wealth Effect
Should we dismissed the argument that a stockmarket crash can have devastating
effects on the real economy? The usual theoretical argument suggests that a stockmarket
crash reduces the wealth of households. This "wealth effect" curbs consumer
spending, affecting production, jobs and profits.
The "wealth effect" is clearly only important if a substantial portion
of households own shares and if the stockmarket capitalisation accounts for a substantial
portion of the economy.
The portion of U.S. households who own shares have been rising but still constitute
only about 40 percent of total households in 1992. The relative share of market capitalisation
of the New York Stock Exchange to GNP is about 70 percent. A sharp fall of 30 percent
in stockmarket values will therefore amount to 21 percent of GNP. Assuming that the
stock of wealth is about ten times GNP, a 30 percent crash amounts to only a fall
of 2.1 percent in total wealth. As consumption is dependent on wealth, the fall will
not amount to any major fall in spending.
Malaysian Economy More Sensitive to Crashes
The Malaysian economy is however more sensitive to crashes. The representation
of households who own shares directly or indirectly is probably similar to the U.S.
profile. The market capitalisation of the KLSE is however about 320 percent of GNP.
This implies that a 30 percent crash in the KLSE amounts to the equivalent wipe-out
of 96 percent of GNP. If the stock of wealth is about 10 times GNP, this still amounts
to a dissappearance of about 10 percent of total wealth. Such a sharp fall in wealth
will inevitably hurt consumer spending.
The Malaysian economy's sensitivity to stockmarket crashes has been increasing
over time with the rising market capitalisation of the KLSE. During the 1987 crash,
Malaysia's stockmarket capitalisation accounted for only about 90 percent of GNP.
As such, the ripple effects from the 1987 crash did not have such far reaching consequences.
However, with the capitalisation accounting for more than 300 percent, Wall Street's
sentiment may have become inevitably linked to the Malaysian economy. This worrisome
conclusion extends to Hong Kong and Singapore whose market capitalisation have both
exceeded 250 percent as well.
TABLE: THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY IS OVEREXPOSED TO A STOCKMARKET
CRASH
Countries
|
Market Cap/ GNP (%)
|
Fall in Value from 30%
Crash as Percent of GNP
|
|
Malaysia |
320
|
96
|
Hong Kong |
290
|
87
|
Singapore |
250
|
75
|
Bangkok |
109
|
33
|
London |
105
|
30
|
New York |
70
|
21
|
Bombay |
38
|
11
|
Jakarta |
35
|
10
|
Some Comforting Thoughts
There are some important factors to account for when linking market capitalisation
to total wealth. First, the rather high market capitalisation of the Kuala Lumpur,
Singapore and Hong Kong stockmarkets are partly a result of its openness to foreign
investors. As such, a large fraction of the market capitalisation is "foreign
wealth" rather than "domestic wealth." The fraction will be higher
in Singapore and Hong Kong than Malaysia. If the fraction of Malaysian shares which
are foreign-held account for as much as 30 percent, then the true "domestic
market-capitalisation to GNP" that matters for calculating the local "wealth
effect" is reduced to only 224 percent.
Second, consumption is dependent on permanent rather than current wealth. Consumers
take into account their future income when deciding on their habits today. If the
fall in the stockmarket is regarded as temporary rather than permanent, consumers
will not treat the loss as a real loss but a temporary paper loss. As a result, consumers
will not reduce their spending as sharply when faced with the fall in current wealth.
A word of caution is noted however as empirical studies have provided evidence that
consumption is linked to current rather than permanent wealth due to the existence
of credit constraints.
Greenspan's Warning Matters More Than Ever
The stockmarket matters more than ever in relation to the Malaysian economy. Listing
of privatised assets have boosted the market capitalisation to GNP ratio by more
than fourfold over the last 10 years, to over 300 percent. Because the 1987 crash
had little impact on the real economy does not imply that the same scenario will
apply again. The wealth of Malaysians are increasingly invested in equities and any
sharp correction will now matter more than ever for most households. In short, the
Malaysian economy is currently overexposed to a stockmarket crash, especially in
relation to other economies.
Other asset markets must be developed to enable average Malaysians to diversify
their portfolio. The rising market capitalisation to GNP has been partly attributed
to the lack of a private debt market. The lack of liquidity on the trading of these
instruments have prevented investors from participating in any major way. The issue
of government bonds has also dried up as a result of the string of budget surpluses
in recent years. If domestic instruments continue to be in short supply, Malaysian
investors and institutions should be permitted to plant their wealth in foreign instruments,
whether equities or debt. Diversification is the most natural way of reducing any
impact on the real economy from an unforseen stockmarket crash. The other course
of action will be to wait and see.
Dr Chua Hak Bin is a senior executive in a KLSE-listed company. The opinions expressed
are solely his own.
( Go Top ) ( Back To Left Brain )
|